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1 Introduction 
Although there has been convergence in employment outcomes between men and women all over 
Europe, the division of unpaid work is still highly asymmetric with women performing most of 
housework tasks and child care. The potential of parental leave policies to tackle this inequality in the 
division of labour is increasingly being recognized by European politicians. On a national level, several 
countries use this instrument in order to encourage fathers to participate more in childcare and to 
promote mothers’ integration into the labour market. In countries like Sweden and Norway, the 
gender-equality focus of leave schemes goes back to the 1970s (Haas and Rostgaard 2011). Sweden 
was the first country to offer fathers the option of using parental leave entitlements in 1974. However, 
at that time, the leave entitlements were transferrable to the mother and many fathers did not use 
them. Therefore, many Nordic countries introduced a so-called “fathers’ quota”, a parental leave 
entitlement that was not transferrable to the mother and would be lost by the family if the father did 
not use it. Norway was the first country to do so, introducing a one-month fathers’ quota in 1993. 
Sweden followed their lead, implementing a one-month fathers’ quota in 1995 and adding a second 
month in 2002. Recently, several countries have introduced parental leave schemes that explicitly 
encourage fathers to use leave. One of the most prominent examples is Iceland, which provides nine 
months of well-paid leave, with three months reserved for each parent, implying a three-month 
fathers’ quota (Eydal and Gíslason 2015). Finland offers a well-paid bonus month and Germany 
introduced a new parental leave benefit scheme in 2007 that reserves two of the fourteen months of 
well-paid leave explicitly for fathers (Blum and Erler 2015; Salmi and Lammi-Taskula 2015). Portugal 
offers twenty days of “fathers’-only parental leave”, making it obligatory for fathers to take two weeks 
of that leave (Wall and Leitão 2015). At a European level, there is a tendency towards the 
standardization of leave legislation in a gender-egalitarian way. The first directive on parental leave 
granted each parent an individual right to parental leave following a birth, for at least three months 
(Council Directive 96/34/EC). The directive further suggested that, to promote equal opportunities and 
equal treatment between men and women, the right to parental leave should, in principle, be granted 
on a non-transferrable basis. The most recent council directive, implemented in 2010, suggests that 
member states should extend the individual right to four months of leave, and even adds that at least 
one of these four months should be provided on a non-transferrable basis (Council Directive 
2010/18/EU).  
However, looking at the leave policies currently in place, it becomes obvious that these policies still 
vary tremendously across countries, especially with regard to their gendered structures. Whereas the 
Nordic countries, Germany and Portugal have taken several steps in the direction of promoting gender 
equality by means of parental leave policies, other countries still encourage parents to follow the 
model of a traditional gender division of labour. For instance, the Hungarian parental leave law 
explicitly states that paid parental leave is not accessible to fathers until the first birthday of a child 
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(Korintus and Gábos 2015). Several countries, such as Ireland, Poland and the United Kingdom, provide 
overly long maternity leave periods, which are by definition not accessible to fathers. Finally, several 
countries provide leave policies that encourage neither gender equality nor a traditional division of 
work, offering a lot of flexibility for parents to choose amongst several options. Austria provides five 
different payment options during parental leave. These range from an income replacement payment 
for twelve months with an additional two months if the father uses the benefit, to a flat-rate payment 
for thirty months with an additional six months of payments if the father uses the benefit (Rille-Pfeiffer 
and Dearing 2015). Similarly, the Czech Republic offers several payment options ranging between an 
income replacement payment for 24 months and flat-rate payments for 48 months.  
Against this background, many social science scholars engage with the question of how parental leave 
policies and their support of a more gender-egalitarian society can be assessed within a systematic 
framework (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Ray et al. 2010; Javornik 2014; Haas and Rostgaard 2011; Ciccia 
and Verloo 2012; Dearing forthcoming). The main concern with all of these contributions lies mainly 
with the deconstruction of the norms inherent in parental leave policies. A recent article by Dearing 
that is forthcoming in the Journal of European Social Policy develops an “Equal Gender Division of 
Labour Indicator” that systematically assesses the performance of 27 European countries regarding 
their compliance with an ideal leave policy model that best supports gender equality in the division of 
labour. 
Given the complexity of leave schemes and the various assumptions that have to be made in 
aggregating these policies into one single measure, the task of validating these systematic indicators 
becomes increasingly important. However, with the exception of Gornick and Meyers (2003), none of 
these contributions relates their systematic measures or suggested typologies to empirical outcomes 
of the gender division of paid or unpaid work. This might be for a good reason, as methodologically it 
is not straightforward to fulfil this task. With this article, I would like to fill this gap in the literature by 
proposing a methodological framework that allows systematic indicators of leave policies to be related 
to empirical data on the division of work. I will use the three single-dimensional indicators and three 
multi-dimensional indicators, proposed by Dearing (forthcoming), and relate these to the total and an 
“unexplained” gender gap in housework hours that is derived from a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as 
a measure for the gender division of unpaid work. Thereby, it will be possible to show how strongly 
related different leave indicators are to the actual distribution of housework, therefore allowing for an 
assessment of the validity of indicators.   
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2 Data 
2.1 Parental leave policies 
For parental leave policies I use data from the International Review of Leave Policies and Research for 
21 European countries from the year 2010, referring to regulations that were in place in April of that 
year (Moss 2010).1 I focus on the year 2010 as this was also the year in which the data on housework 
were collected, as discussed in the next section. Table 1 gives an overview of the leave policies 
implemented in 2010. For now, I want to focus on the first columns of the table that refer to the 
different types of leave that typically make up a set of parental leave policies: maternity, paternity, 
parental and childcare leave. Following Moss (2014), they can be described as follows. The first 
element, maternity leave, denotes an employment-protected leave of absence for mothers around the 
time of childbirth. This type of leave is generally understood as a health and welfare measure, intended 
to protect the health of mother and child. As can be seen from Table 1, in 2010 all European countries 
provided maternity leave regulation, with the leave duration varying between one and about three 
months in Sweden, Norway and Belgium, and from 9.7 to 12.1 months in the UK and Ireland, most of 
it well-paid. The second element, paternity leave, denotes an employment-protected leave of absence 
for fathers after childbirth. This type of leave aims at enabling fathers to spend time with their families 
around the time of childbirth and is mostly used in parallel to the maternity leave entitlement of a 
mother. Paternity leave was only offered in some countries, ranging between two days in Greece and 
the Netherlands to thirteen weeks in Slovenia, and often featured an income replacement rate similar 
to that applied to maternity leave. The third element, parental leave, denotes an employment-
protected leave of absence for employed parents – mothers or fathers – often following the maternity 
or paternity leave periods. This type of leave aims to enable parents to care for their young children. 
Parental leave regulations varied widely across European countries – between no leave in Switzerland 
and three years in Poland. Many countries provided payments during parental leave, either in the form 
of a generous income replacement payment or in the form of a less generous flat-rate benefit. In 
addition, several countries, such as Croatia, Hungary and Finland, provided childcare leave after a 
                                                          
 
1 The policy data on Switzerland come from the 2011 report. However, there were no reforms in the leave scheme between 
April 2010 and April 2011.  
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parental leave entitlement had expired. These entitlements were mostly paid at a very low flat rate or 
even unpaid.  
--- Table 1 about here --- 
There are several options for explicitly building the policy objective of gender sharing into parental 
leave regulations. Most prominently, a “fathers’ quota” that reserves some portion of leave for the 
father can be implemented as a measure to increase their leave taking. As can be seen from the column 
that refers to “leave reserved for fathers”, several countries explicitly reserved leave for fathers. For 
instance, in Sweden, 60 days out of the duration of paid parental leave were reserved for each parent 
and were not transferrable. In Norway, there was a two-month fathers’ quota. Other countries, such 
as Germany and Portugal, provided bonus months of paid leave that were only for fathers. 
The general use of the term "parental leave" in the literature, however, is ambiguous – sometimes 
denoting an actual parental leave regulation in a narrow sense, sometimes applied as an umbrella term 
subsuming all three types of leave. Some countries, such as Norway and Sweden, do not necessarily 
distinguish between maternity, paternity and parental leaves, referring only to “birth leave”, part of 
which is for mothers, part for fathers, and part for parents to divide as they choose. In this article, the 
term “parental leave”, or simply “leave”, is used as an umbrella term and will refer to the sum of all of 
these types of leave, including maternity, paternity, parental (in a narrow sense) and childcare leave. 
Furthermore, this article will distinguish between “total leave”, denoting the total duration of leave, 
whether paid or unpaid, and “paid leave”, denoting only that leave period that is supplemented 
financially. 
2.2 Gender division of housework 
The data on the gender division of housework comes from the 2010 wave of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) for the same 21 European countries as mentioned above. The ESS is a cross-national 
survey that has been conducted every two years across Europe since 2001. The questionnaire consists 
of a collection of questions that can be classified into two main parts – a core section and a rotating 
section. The rotating section is dedicated to specific themes and in 2010 it focused on family work and 
well-being, including the following question about the total hours spent on housework: “About how 
many hours a week, in total, do you personally spend on housework? By housework, I mean things 
done around the home such as cooking, washing, cleaning, care of clothes, shopping, maintenance of 
property, but not including childcare or leisure activities.” It has to be noted that Press and Townsley 
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(1998) show that there is a “reporting gap” between direct-question reports of housework and time-
use reports indicating that both men and women tend to over report their housework contributions. 
This “reporting gap” might, as well, be different across countries. In addition, there are specific 
household tasks that are predominantly performed by women. These tasks are usually more routine 
and less pleasant, such as doing laundry and shopping for groceries (Coltrane 2000). Using the data 
provided by the ESS, I cannot account for these differences. The core section provides information on 
individual and household characteristics, such as the gender, age, education and working hours in paid 
employment of the respondents. Although the ESS does not ask about the specific income of the 
respondent, there is a categorical income measure that refers to the proportion of the household 
income the respondent provides (ranging from “very small” to “all”).  
I consider a sample of 4,805 parents with children under the age of 7. For the purpose of this study I 
analyse a pooled file that consists of all 21 countries. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the sample. 
Samples sizes vary across countries, between 150 respondents in Slovenia and 347 in Ireland. Mothers 
of young children spent on average 22.4 hours per week on housework, whereas fathers did only 9.5 
hours of housework per week. There is a huge variety in housework hours across European countries. 
France is the country where mothers reported doing the least housework, at 13.8 hours per week, 
while in Poland mothers reported spending about 32.2 hours on household tasks. With 5.9 hours per 
week, French fathers appear to have done the least hours of housework, while Polish fathers did the 
most.  
Individual and household characteristics will be used as control variables in this analysis, also drawing 
on the ESS data.  
Controls included in the estimation include characteristics that are commonly used in the study of 
housework (see Stier and Lewin-Epstein 2007; Cooke 2007; Bittman et al. 2003; Fuwa 2004; Fuwa and 
Cohen 2007). The time respondents have available apart from employment hours is captured by a 
variable that refers to the number of hours worked in paid employment. Bargaining models predict 
that argue that spouses have conflicting interests and the partner with greater resources – in terms of 
a better relative income and outside options – uses the greater bargaining power to avoid housework 
(e.g. Farkas & England, 1986). This claim is supported by empirical literature showing that spouses that 
provide a considerable share of the household income are usually less involved in housework. The 
economic status of spouses was measured by a question that asked about the proportion of the 
household income the respondent provided. This response options range from “very small” to “very 
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large”. Another determining factor for respondents’ housework hours is the housework done by their 
partner. It is especially men who seem to be influenced by the amount of housework done by their 
partners. There seems to be some kind of spillover effect: men do more housework if the overall level 
of housework done by their partner increases. Therefore, it is important to consider the housework 
hours of the partner to account for this effect. Education is found to have an influence on housework 
and was measured in the survey as a categorical variable referring to the highest level of education 
completed by the respondent.  
3 Measuring parental leave policies 
3.1 One-dimensional indicators 
What would be the best indicator to capture the gendered structures of leave policies? There are 
several possibilities for capturing this aspect of leave policies  with a single indicator. In the literature 
that studies the effects of leave policies on the gender division of work, there are in particular two 
indicators that are most common. First, several studies use the total length of all parental leave 
entitlements  (Misra et al. 2011; Erhel and Guergoat-Larivière 2013; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Hook 
2010). Second, other studies refer to an indicator that not only accounts for the duration of leave that 
is supplemented financially. (Akgunduz and Plantenga 2012; Ronsen and Sundström 2002; Pettit and 
Hook 2005). Another measure that more explicitly refers to incentives for fathers implemented in leave 
schemes is whether or not there exists an individual and non-transferrable right to leave for fathers. 
Most prominently, several micro-level studies use the weeks of leave explicitly reserved for fathers 
(Boll et al., 2014; Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011; Ekberg et al. 2013; Duvander and Johansson 2012; 
Schober 2014).  
The last three columns in Table 1 give an overview of the actual distribution of these three single-
dimensional leave measures. The duration of total leave is the sum of all maternity, parental and 
childcare leave entitlements. The duration of well-paid leave is the sum of all maternity, paternity, 
parental and childcare leave entitlements that replace at least 66% of earnings. The share of well-paid 
leave reserved for fathers refers to the portion of well-paid leave that is based on a non-transferrable 
individual leave entitlement for fathers. 
Although, theoretically, flexibility in leave schemes might also have an effect on the gender division of 
work by, for instance, making it easier for fathers to get involved in childcare, there is no empirical 
study that accounts for it. This might be for a good reason. As Moss (2014) suggests, “flexibility” in 
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leave schemes takes a number of forms including, for instance, the possibility (i) to take leave in one 
continuous block or several shorter blocks, (ii) to take leave on a full-time or part-time basis, (iii) to 
take longer periods of low-paid leave or shorter periods with higher benefits, and (iv) to take leave at 
the same time as the other parent. Therefore, “flexibility” will not be considered in my analysis as it is 
difficult to operationalize. 
3.2 Multidimensional indicators 
As leave policies are very complex and diverse, it might not be enough to use one-dimensional 
measures in order to account for their gendered structures. Therefore, as discussed in the introduction 
of this article, several scholars engage with the question of how parental leave policies and their 
support of a more gender-egalitarian society can be assessed within a systematic framework (Gornick 
and Meyers 2003; Ray et al. 2010; Javornik 2014; Haas and Rostgaard 2011; Ciccia and Verloo 2012; 
Dearing forthcoming). In my analysis I will focus on one set of these composite indicators, namely the 
three “equal gender division of labour” indicators that were developed by Dearing (forthcoming). 
Based on the most salient results from the empirical literature, this article suggests an ideal leave 
model that foresees the provision of fourteen months of well-paid leave, half of which is reserved for 
fathers. An “equal gender division of labour” (EGDL) indicator is developed to assess the performance 
of different countries regarding their compliance with the ideal leave model. Three policy aspects are 
considered in the construction of the composite EGDL indicator: (i) the duration of total leave, (ii) the 
duration of well-paid leave and (iii) the share of well-paid leave that is explicitly reserved for the father.  
Accordingly, the baseline EGDL indicator combines three single indices which account for the 
performance of a country’s leave policies with regard to these three policy features. The first index 
accounts for the performance with regard to the total duration of leave. As this is suggested by the 
empirical literature, Dearing (forthcoming) proposes a non-linear relation between the duration of 
total leave and gender equality in the division of labour, as captured by an index with an inverted V-
shape ranging from 0 to 1. This assumes that the total duration of leave has an increasingly positive 
effect on mothers’ employment (and therefore on a more balanced gender division of labour), but only 
up to a certain point of “moderate duration”, after which the positive effect begins to diminish again. 
The index equals zero if the duration of total leave is zero or if it is very long. The index equals one if 
the duration is “moderate”, i.e. 14 months. Second, with regard to the index based on the duration of 
well-paid leave, another non-linear inverted V-shape represents the relation between the duration of 
well-paid leave and the gender division of labour. Again, the index equals zero if the duration of well-
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paid leave is zero or if it is very long, and it equals one if the duration of well-paid leave is “moderate” 
(i.e., 14 months). Third, considering the index with regard to leave months reserved for the father, 
Dearing (forthcoming) assumes that an ideal policy would reserve half of the duration of paid parental 
leave for fathers. Therefore, this index is assumed to follow a positively sloped linear function 
represented by a straight line. The index equals a maximum value of one if half of the well-paid leave 
is reserved for fathers and equals zero if no leave is reserved for fathers. The baseline EGDL indicator 
is then designed as an unweighted additive composite indicator constructed from these three single 
indices:   
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𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)3  
In a second scenario, Dearing calculates a father-centred EGDL indicator that puts more weight on a 
country’s performance with respect to providing leave reserved for fathers: 
𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= [𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝟐𝟐 (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)]4  
A third scenario proposes a mother-centred EGDL indicator, assuming that gender equality in the 
division of labour is tackled best by the provision of a moderate duration of total leave in combination 
with a moderate duration of well-paid leave: 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= 2 (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖3  
Table 1 displays the EGDL values for each of the 21 countries. In what follows I will relate these six 
different indicators for leave policies to the division of unpaid work between mothers and fathers in 
21 European countries.  
4 Methodological approach 
As a measure for the gender division of unpaid work, I focus on the division of housework. As can be 
seen from Table 2, hours of housework per week are still distributed highly unequally between women 
and men with young children. However, whereas parental leave indicators are measures on a macro 
level, these data are individual-level data on a micro level. How, then, does one relate macro-level 
policy indicators with micro-level data on the actual distribution of housework among young parents? 
One, very simple way to relate leave measures to housework would be to compute the difference in 
the average hours of housework between fathers and mothers for each country and simply correlate 
these with the different leave indicators. However, as discussed above, several studies show that 
individual characteristics are strongly associated with contributions to housework. Therefore, when 
studying the division of housework, differences in the individual characteristics of the respondents 
need to be considered. At best, parental leave indicators would be compared to the gender gap in 
housework hours, net of differences in individual characteristics.  
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--- Table 2 about here --- 
The most common way to do this is to apply multi-level modelling techniques (such as is done in Stier 
and Lewin-Epstein 2007; Fuwa and Cohen 2007). However, Bryan and Jenkins (2015) in the European 
Sociological Review show that users of multi-level modelling techniques require 25 countries for linear 
models at the very minimum, and most likely more for models with a specification other than a 
relatively basic one. Therefore applying multi-level modelling techniques for my analysis is not feasible, 
as my sample comprises 21 countries only.  
Against this backdrop, the following analysis will be based on a method that ranges somewhere “in the 
middle” of these two approaches. I draw on a method that is usually used in labour economics to 
decompose mean differences in wages based on linear regression models in a counterfactual manner. 
The procedure is known in the literature as the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 
1973). It divides the mean differences in wages between two groups (e.g. men and women) in a part 
that is due to differences in observed characteristics related to productivity (explained variation) and 
a residual part (unexplained variation). The residual part is often used as a measure for discrimination, 
but it also subsumes the effects of group differences in unobserved predictors (Jann 2008). I will use 
this procedure in order to measure the “unexplained part” of the gender gap in housework hours. This 
“unexplained part” is net of those differences in the gender gap in housework hours that are 
attributable to differences in individual characteristics.  
Let me illustrate the intuition behind the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (O’Donnell et al. 2008). 
Suppose we have an outcome variable, y, which would be weekly hours of housework in the case of 
my study. Let us assume y is explained by a vector of individual and household characteristics, x, 
according to a regression model that can be written as follows for women and men separately: 
𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓,𝑚𝑚 = �  𝛽𝛽0𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽0𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖   𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
In Figure 1, we see an illustration of the relationship between the outcome variable y and a single 
explanatory variable x. Here, mothers are assumed to have a slightly steeper regression line than 
fathers. Considering the example of housework as an outcome variable, this would imply that a single 
explanatory variable x, such as income, would reduce the housework hours of mothers more than it 
would those of fathers. In addition, the intercept of the mothers’ equation is larger, in that, at each 
value of x, the outcome, y, is higher for mothers. To put this differently, comparing a mother and a 
father with no income at all, the mother would perform more housework. In addition, mothers are 
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assumed to have a lower mean of this particular x, e.g. income. The result is that mothers have a higher 
mean value of y (𝑦𝑦�𝑓𝑓) than fathers do (𝑦𝑦�𝑚𝑚). That is, on average they do more housework.  
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
The gap between the mean outcome for mothers (𝑦𝑦�𝑓𝑓) and fathers (𝑦𝑦�𝑚𝑚) can now be partitioned into a 
part attributable to the fact that mothers have worse x’s than fathers (∆𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓) and a part attributable 
to the fact that, ex hypothesi, they have a “worse” intercept and slope (∆𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚). This decomposition 
can then be seen as a special case of a more general decomposition so that the gap in mean outcomes 
can be thought of as deriving from a gap in endowments, a gap in coefficients or slope, and a gap 
arising from the interaction of endowments and coefficients or slopes. Instead of interpreting the 
unexplained part of this decomposition as discrimination (as in the case of a decomposition of the 
wage gap), it can be interpreted as a part that refers to the gap in housework net of individual 
characteristics. This “unexplained gap” could be a proxy for “other” determinants of the gender gap in 
housework. I follow two recent articles published in Labour Economics, Christofides et al. (2013) and 
Melly (2005), which argue that this unexplained part in the gender gap in wages might be 
systematically related to macro-level factors such as work-family reconciliation policies and wage-
setting institutions. I want to adapt this approach to study whether the unexplained part in the gender 
gap in housework is systematically related to parental leave policies and analyse how the different 
leave indicators relate to it. 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
Table 3 shows the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for a pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model of housework hours for all 21 countries. The model accounts for the housework hours of 
the partner, the education, the working hours in employment and the proportion of the household 
income provided by the respondent. As panel A of the table shows, a European father with children 
under the age of seven years with average characteristics does 9.3 hours of housework per week, 
whereas a mother in the same situation spends 22.1 hours on household activities. This results in a 
gender gap in housework of 12.7 hours per week across all 21 European countries.  
--- Table 3 about here --- 
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Panel B of the table shows the “endowment effect”, which is the average decrease we would see in 
women’s housework hours if they had the same characteristics as men. It can be seen that, unlike, for 
example, in the case of the decomposition of wages, the gender gap in housework cannot be attributed 
to an unfavourable distribution of individual characteristics in the pooled model. Clearly, on the one 
hand there is an endowment effect from some characteristics that works in the direction of the gender 
gap. For instance, as the coefficient on income shows, fathers are more likely to provide a large 
proportion of household income, which decreases their housework and worsens the gap. If mothers 
on average had the same income as fathers, they would decrease their housework by 6.8 hours per 
week. However, on the other hand, fathers are more likely to have a partner who spends many hours 
on housework activities, which has a positive effect on their housework activities and therefore 
decreases the gap. To put it differently, if the mothers in my sample had partners who worked as much 
in the household as do the partners of the fathers, the mothers would do even more housework due 
to a spillover effect, which would further widen the gap. Similarly, education works slightly against the 
gender gap. Education has a negative influence on housework. If the mothers, who are on average 
slightly better educated than the men, had the same level of education as the “average” father in their 
country, then the mothers would do slightly more housework, which, again, would work in the 
direction of the gap. Overall, the total endowment effect is very small, at 0.2 hours per week, and 
insignificant. Panel C reports the results for the interaction effect, which refers to that part of the 
gender gap that accounts for differences in characteristics and coefficients that exist simultaneously 
between the two groups. For instance, it seems that a combination of the endowment and coefficient 
effect for income works against the gender gap. This means that the negative endowment effect of 
income turns positive in the interaction with the coefficient on income.  
Panel D refers to the part of the gender gap that remains unexplained, and shows that, if mothers had 
the same average characteristics as fathers, they would still do 11.8 hours of housework more than 
them per week. Interestingly, this large unexplained part is mainly due to a very much larger intercept 
in the female equation for housework, as can be seen from the coefficient of the constant. Therefore, 
setting all characteristics to zero, mothers simply start at a much higher level of housework, 
independent of how the characteristics are distributed. The coefficients of education and income 
actually even work in favour of mothers, indicating that if, for instance, the income of the respondents 
were to increase, the mothers would reduce their housework hours much more than the fathers 
would.  
--- Table 4 about here --- 
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From the pooled model, it could be concluded that there is not much difference between the total and 
the unexplained gender gap in housework, as the explanatory variables work in opposite directions 
and offsetting each other to a great extent. However, as Table 4 shows, the results of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition are very different for each of the 21 countries. The first column shows the 
predictions for fathers’ housework for a man with average characteristics. According to these 
predictions, fathers in France and Switzerland do the least housework, at 5.9 and 6.5 hours per week. 
Fathers in Ireland and Russia do the most housework, at 14.3 and 12.4 hours per week. Mothers in 
France and Norway do the least housework (13.9 and 14.6 hours) and those in Poland and Greece do 
the most (31.6 and 31.2 hours). With regard to the gender gap in housework, Sweden and Norway 
have the smallest gaps, with mean differences in housework hours between mothers and fathers of 
6.9 and 7 hours per week. Greece and Poland have the largest gaps in housework hours (23.3 and 19.4 
hours). The endowment effect is negative for Russia, the Czech Republic, Spain and Greece. Therefore, 
for these countries a part of the total gap in housework can, indeed, be attributed to an unfavourable 
distribution of individual characteristics. However, this picture is put into perspective when we note 
that the interaction effect for these countries works in the other direction and only the coefficients for 
Russia are significant. As shown in the fifth column of the table, the unexplained part of the gender 
gap is lowest in the UK and Portugal, where the gap decreases from 9.6 to 6.7 hours and from 8.8 to 
6.8 hours after differences in the average characteristics between fathers and mothers are accounted 
for. The largest unexplained gaps can be found in Greece and Croatia, where they are 22.6 and 22.4 
hours per week.  
5.2 Relating the total gender gap in housework hours to the six leave indicators 
Figure 2 relates the total gender gap in housework to the parental leave policy indicators. The six panels 
respectively show scatter plots with linear regression lines of the gender gap in relation to (a) the total 
duration of leave, (b) the well-paid duration of leave, (c) the well-paid duration of leave reserved for 
fathers, (d) the baseline EGDL indicator, (e) the father-centred EGDL indicator and (f) the mother-
centred EGDL indicator, as presented in the last six columns of Table 1.   
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
There is a systematic relation between the total gender gap in housework and the leave indicators. 
However, the nature of this relation depends largely on the specific indicator that is used, as can also 
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be seen from the correlation coefficients provided in Table 5.2 However, it has to be noted that these 
results are mainly of a descriptive nature as we are looking at a regression line constructed from 21 
observations and inferences about the causal effects of leave on housework are not possible. 
Nevertheless, these graphs provide insights on the association between the gender gap in housework 
and the leave policy indicators.  
--- Table 5 about here --- 
As we can see from panels A and B, there is a slightly positive relationship between the gender gap in 
housework and the duration of total and paid leave. With regard to the total duration of leave, this 
positive relation mainly derives from a group of countries with low to moderate gender gaps and 
relatively short durations of total leave, including Switzerland, Slovenia and Denmark, and another 
group of countries that exhibit large gaps and provide very long durations of total leave, namely 
Poland, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, there is only little variation in the duration 
of total leave, with the majority of countries providing around 36 months. In panel B, there is a large 
cluster of countries that provide very short durations of paid leave and exhibit only small unexplained 
gender gaps, including the UK, France and Belgium. Another cluster is formed by the Nordic countries, 
providing moderate durations of paid leave in combination with very small gender gaps in housework. 
Greece, Croatia and Hungary provide moderate to long durations of paid leave and have large gender 
gaps in housework.  
From panel C it can be seen that this relation changes from positive to negative when the duration of 
well-paid leave reserved for fathers is considered as the leave indicator, indicating that it is countries 
with long durations reserved for fathers that have relatively small gaps in housework and vice versa. 
This is mainly driven by two groups of countries, on the one hand, Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Germany with between 1.5 and 2.5 months reserved for fathers and moderate to low gaps in 
housework and, on the other hand, Greece, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that reserve very 
little or no paid leave for fathers and have large gender gaps in housework.   
                                                          
 
2 I tested whether this relation was significant by regressing the total gender gap on the parental leave indicators. The 
slopes of all panels were significant at the 1% level. 
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Analysing the results for the multi-dimensional leave indicators in panels D to F, we can see a clear 
negative relation between the gap in housework and the EGDL indicator values. Panel D shows that it 
is the Nordic countries and Slovenia, with very low EGDL baseline indicator values that have low gender 
gaps in housework. These countries seem to provide strong leave policies with regard to the 
encouragement of gender equality in the division of work, as suggested by the high EGDL values, and 
also seem to have a relatively balanced gender division of housework. On the other hand, countries 
with low EGDL baseline values depict high gender gaps in housework (e.g. Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic). The assessment of the father-centred EGDL indicator correlates even more strongly 
with the actual gender gap in housework, as countries with a lower gender gap, such as Portugal and 
Finland, improve their standing relative to the EGDL baseline design, being rewarded for reserving 10 
to 20% of their paid leave for fathers. The mother-centred EGDL indicator, presented in panel F, again 
absorbs some of the negative relation, dissolving the strong cluster of the Nordic countries in the right 
bottom segment. Similarly, the large group of countries that have moderate baseline and father-
centred EGDL values in combination with moderate to low gender gaps in housework is now punished 
by the design of the mother-centred leave policies, because they provide leave schemes that mostly 
combine short duration of payments with very long durations of total leave.   
5.3 Relating the unexplained gender gap in housework hours to the six leave indicators 
Figure 3 depicts the relation between the six different leave indicators and the unexplained gender 
gap in housework hours derived from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, as reported in the sixth 
column of Table 4. Accounting for the differences in characteristics between fathers and mothers 
slightly changes the results. Whereas panel A remains largely unaffected, panel B shows a much 
stronger positive relation between the duration of well-paid leave and the unexplained gender gap in 
housework, compared to the total gap in housework. The respective correlation coefficient in Table 5 
increases from 0.081 to 0.339.3 This change is mainly driven by a group of countries, namely the UK, 
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, with very short leave entitlements that 
have much smaller gaps after the differences in individual characteristics between the mothers and 
fathers are accounted for. In the UK, for instance, the gender gap decreases from 9.6 to 6.7 hours a 
                                                          
 
3 I tested whether this relation was significant by regressing the unexplained gender gap on the parental leave indicators. 
Except for the mother-centred EGDL indicators, all slopes were significant at the 1% level. 
16 
 
week, as can be seen from Table 4. With regard to panel C, the negative relation between the duration 
of well-paid leave reserved for fathers and the gender gap in housework is no longer as strong as it 
was in the assessment depicted in Figure 2. This change is, again, driven by the same cluster of 
countries with very short or no paid leave for fathers, which now have smaller gaps in housework.  
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
Looking at the relation between the multidimensional EGDL indicators and the unexplained gender 
gap in housework in panels D to F of Figure 3, it can be seen that accounting for differences in individual 
characteristics softens the strong negative relation found in the assessment of the total gap. Focusing 
on the baseline and father-centred EGDL indicator, these changes are driven by several countries. On 
the one hand, there are countries like Slovenia and Croatia that have large EGDL values and – after the 
difference in individual-level characteristics has been accounted for – even larger gender gaps in 
housework. Table 4 suggests that this is mainly due to a strong positive endowment effect, implying 
that the individual characteristics in these countries actually favour women and decrease the gender 
gap in housework. Therefore, accounting for differences in mean characteristics implies that the 
unexplained gap is even larger than the total gap. Looking, for instance, at the decomposition results 
for Slovenia in more detail, it seems that this endowment effect is driven by education and the 
housework hours of the partner.4 With regard to education, this finding is in line with the descriptive 
results of Table 2 – the mothers from Slovenia in my sample are much better educated than the fathers. 
This seems to have a narrowing effect on the gender gap in housework. Similarly, the housework hours 
of the partner work against the gender gap, which implies that Slovenian fathers are strongly 
influenced by the housework hours done by their partner. The detailed results of the OLS housework 
model for fathers suggest that, for each hour of housework done by their partner, they increase their 
own housework engagement by 0.4 hours.5  
On the other hand, it is again the same group of countries consisting of the UK, Switzerland, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the Czech Republic that still have low to moderate EGDL values, but now also 
have lower gender gaps. The Czech Republic, for instance, is a country with very low EGDL values. The 
                                                          
 
4 The detailed results are available from the author upon request. 
5 However, it has to be noted that these results are based on a small sample of 62 fathers and 88 mothers. Therefore, 
generalization of these results is not possible. 
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total gender gap for this country is reduced from 17.7 to 11.9 hours per week after differences in 
individual characteristics are accounted for. This is mainly due to a large endowment effect that 
worsens the gender gap in housework. The detailed decomposition for the Czech Republic suggests 
that the endowment effect is mainly driven by differences in income.6 Fathers are more likely to 
provide higher shares of income to the household budget, which in turn seems to negatively affect 
their engagement in housework. If mothers, on average, provided the same proportion of income, they 
would decrease their housework by four hours per week. The negative relation found between the 
total gender gap and the mother-centred EGDL indicator practically disappears when differences in 
individual characteristics are accounted for.  
6 Discussion and conclusions 
What can we learn from this analysis of using different indicators for parental leave? First, my results 
suggest that the one-dimensional leave indicators that account for the durations of total and well-paid 
leave might not be the right measures to use to account for the gender-egalitarian implications of leave 
policies as they show practically no correlation with the gender gap in housework. They even slightly 
suggest that in countries with short durations of total and well-paid leave the gender gap in housework 
is small and vice versa.  Second, the results indicate a systematic negative relation between the 
multidimensional baseline and father-centred EGDL indicators and the gender gap in housework, 
although this relation is softened when one accounts for differences in individual characteristics. 
Countries with low EGDL values have high gender gaps in housework and vice versa, suggesting that 
these indicators might suit very well the purpose of accounting for the gender-egalitarian implications 
of leave policies. With regard to the mother-centred EGDL indicator, I did not find this systematic 
negative relation. This might be due to the design of this specific indicator. By definition, the indicator 
centres on the perspective of the disadvantaged situation of mothers in employment, suggesting that 
it can only be the combination of moderate durations of total and paid leave that contributes to a 
better integration of mothers into the labour market. This indicator might not be the right choice for 
measuring the gender structures inherent in leave policies in the sphere of unpaid work. It might be 
interesting for future research to complete the picture of this analysis by relating the different leave 
indicators to an outcome measure that accounts for the gender division of employment. In the case of 
                                                          
 
6 The detailed results are available from the author upon request. 
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studying, for instance, the gender gap in employment hours, a much stronger negative relation could 
show for the mother-centred EGDL indicator . Third, my analysis shows that it is indispensable that one 
considers the duration of well-paid leave that is reserved for fathers in any measure intended to 
account for the gender-egalitarian dimension of leave policies. It is the two measures in panels C and 
E, which are solely or to a large extent based on the duration of well-paid leave, that also depict the 
strongest negative correlation with the total or unexplained gender gap in housework. Those countries 
that reserve a larger share of paid leave for fathers also have small gender gaps in housework.  
Interestingly, in practically all of the assessments, Greece and Croatia take the role of outliers. For 
instance, they score comparatively well on all of the three EGDL indicators as they provide moderate 
durations of well-paid leave in combination with a moderate duration of total leave in the case of 
Greece and in combination with two months of leave reserved for fathers in the case of Croatia. 
However, they depict very high gender gaps in housework, even after differences in individual 
characteristics are accounted for. How can we make sense of these findings? Looking at the country 
report for Greece in the 2010 annual review more closely, it can be seen that there is no information 
on the actual take-up of leave policies, but it is feared by the policy expert who has written the country 
note that, due to the economic crisis and high unemployment, take-up rates would have been 
negatively affected (Kazassi, 2010). This fact points to a weakness of my assessment. I have related 
normative implications of leave policies to the actual outcome of housework hours, ignoring the take-
up rates as mediating factor. It might be that leave policies – in theory – are conducive to gender 
equality in the division of labour, but there might be some factors, such as an economic crisis, that 
hinder people’s exercising of their rights. Unfortunately, there are no comparative data on the take-
up of leave regulations across European countries. With regard to Croatia, studying the country note 
in more detail shows that, although parental leave is paid at 100% of average earnings, it is subject to 
a very low income ceiling of 80% of the budgetary base rate of HRK3,326 (€460) per month, which 
equals about 368 Euro per month (Dobrotić, 2010). This very low income ceiling might undercut the 
beneficial effect of the moderate durations of paid leave and the two fathers’-only months of leave. 
This finding suggests that it is always important to combine aggregate measures of leave policies with 
detailed policy information for the countries under assessment.  
With regard to the measurement of the distribution of housework, my analysis shows that it is 
important to consider differences in the individual characteristics of mothers and fathers when 
referring to differences in their housework hours. In this respect, has to be noted that the “unexplained 
part” derived by the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, as well, includes other unobserved factors that 
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might determine the gender division of housework. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results show 
that the differences between the total and the unexplained gap vary considerable across countries. In 
some countries, such as Slovenia, there is a strong positive endowment effect, implying that the 
individual characteristics in these countries actually favour women and decrease the gender gap in 
housework. In other countries, such as the Czech Republic, there is a large negative endowment effect 
that worsens the gender gap in housework. However, overall, it is not possible to identify a clear 
endowment effect, as in the case of the decomposition of the wage gap, where endowments much 
more obviously contribute to the disadvantage of women. Decomposing the gender gap in housework, 
I have shown that, whereas the differences in some characteristics of mothers and fathers, such as 
income and working hours, do contribute to the disadvantage of mothers and therefore worsen the 
gap, others actually work against the gap. Education, for instance, has a negative effect on housework 
and counteracts the gender gap in housework in several countries, where mothers are better 
educated. Interestingly, the unexplained part of the gender gap in housework is mainly due to a large 
intercept in most countries. This finding points to the strong social norms that still exist regarding the 
distribution of housework between parents. 
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8 Appendix 
Table 1: Parental leave policies as of April 2010 
 
 
Countries
total
well-
paid
total
well-
paid
total
well-
paid
total
well-
paid
total 
well-
paid 
well-paid reserved 
for fathers
Baseline 
Father-
centred 
Mother-
centred
Belgium 3.2 3.2 0.5 0.5 6 0 24 0 33.2 3.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2
Croatia 7.0 7.0 0 0 8 8 until 3 BD 0 37.0 15 2 0.5 0.4 0.3
Czech Republic 6.0 0.0 0 0 until 3 BD 0 0 0 38 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Denmark 4.2 4.2 0.5 0.5 7.4 7.4 0 0 11.6 12.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Estonia 4.7 4.7 0.3 0 until 3 BD 14.4 0 0 37 19.1 0 0.3 0.2 0.1
Finland 4.1 4.1 1.4 1.4 5.2 5.2 until 3 BD 0 36.5 10.7 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
France 3.7 3.7 0.5 0.5 until 3 BD 0 0 0 36.7 4.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1
Germany 3.3 3.3 0 0 until 3 BD 14 0 0 37.4 15.4 2 0.5 0.4 0.3
Greece 4.0 4.0 0.1 0 8 0 7.5 7.5 19.5 11.5 0 0.6 0.4 0.5
Hungary 5.6 5.6 0.2 0.2 until 2 BD 24 until 3 BD 0 36 24 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
Ireland 9.7 6.0 0 0 6.5 0 0 0 16.2 6 0 0.5 0.3 0.3
Netherlands 3.7 3.7 0.1 0.1 12 0 0 0 15.7 3.8 0 0.4 0.3 0.2
Norway 2.1 2.1 0.5 0 13 13 24 0 37.0 13.7 2.3 0.6 0.5 0.3
Poland 5.1 5.1 0.2 0.2 36 0 0 0 41.1 5.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Portugal 5.0 5.0 1 1 6 0 24 0 35.0 6 1 0.4 0.4 0.2
Russia 4.7 4.7 0 0 until 3 BD 0 0 0 38.4 4.7 0 0.2 0.2 0.1
Slovenia 3.5 3.5 3 0.5 8.6 8.6 0 0 12.1 12.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Spain 3.7 3.7 0.5 0.5 until 3 BD 0 0 0 36 4.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2
Sweden 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 18 13 0 0 18.0 13.5 2.5 0.7 0.6 0.7
Switzerland 3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 0.2 0.1 0.0
United Kingdom 12.1 1.4 0.5 0 6 0 0 0 18.1 1.4 0 0.3 0.2 0.1
Maternity Leave 
in months
Paternity Leave 
in months
Parental Leave in 
months
Child Care Leave Multi-dimensional EGDL indicatorsOne-dimensional leave indicator
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 Source: Author’s calculations based on Moss (2010) and Dearing (forthcoming) 
 Key: The duration of total leave is the sum of all maternity, parental and childcare leave entitlements. The duration of well-paid leave is the sum of all maternity, 
paternity, parental and childcare leave entitlements that are well-paid, i.e. that replace at least 66% of earnings. The share of well-paid leave reserved for fathers 
refers to the portion of well-paid leave that is based on a non-transferrable individual leave entitlement for fathers. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the European Social Survey 2010 
 
Countries
Sample 
size
Mean 
housework 
hours
Mean 
housework  
hours partner
Mean 
employment 
hours
Mean 
education
Mean portion of 
HH income 
provided
Sample 
size
Mean 
housework 
hours
Mean 
housework  
hours partner
Mean 
employment 
hours
Mean 
education
Mean portion 
of income 
provided 
Belgium 113 18.7 5.9 32.7 5.2 3.2 101 7.8 19.9 46.6 4.9 5
Croatia 93 29.5 7.8 40.4 4.1 2.8 67 11.6 30 50.3 3.9 4.2
Czech Republic 134 27.4 9.1 39.1 4 2.7 106 10.4 26.8 46.1 4.1 5.5
Denmark 85 15 8.6 34.6 4.9 3.3 86 7.3 13.9 42.2 4.6 4.7
Estonia 132 24.2 12.2 38.7 4.9 3 101 12.7 24.7 46.4 4.5 4.8
Finland 119 17.5 8.1 35.3 5.2 3.1 110 8.4 14.9 41.7 5.2 4.9
France 116 13.8 4.4 32.8 4.6 3.4 95 5.9 14.1 42.1 4.1 4.5
Germany 147 21.6 5.6 28.7 4.1 2.7 136 7.8 24.3 43.8 4.1 5.3
Greece 210 31.1 6.2 28.8 4 2.5 107 8.5 28.5 48.1 3.9 5.7
Hungary 97 30.5 9.9 36.8 4.1 3.2 79 11.3 31.2 45.1 4 4.7
Ireland 212 23.1 7.5 28.4 4.8 2.9 135 12.3 19.9 39.7 4.3 4.9
Netherlands 110 20.3 6.7 25.7 4.1 3.1 104 8.5 20.3 43 4.1 5
Norway 119 14.6 7.8 34 5.1 3.5 121 7.7 13.4 40.5 5 4.9
Poland 135 32.2 10.5 35.4 4.6 2.6 138 13.5 36.2 48.5 4 5.2
Portugal 103 17 4.7 40.3 3 3.2 71 7.2 12.5 44.3 3.3 5
Russian Federation 126 28.8 13.8 35.9 5.5 2.8 143 13.1 29.8 45.1 5 5.3
Slovenia 88 21.2 11 40.8 4.6 3.7 62 13.3 25 46.4 3.8 4.1
Spain 126 21 8.6 35.9 3.8 3.1 138 7.9 23.8 45.2 3.9 5.2
Sweden 91 17.6 8.8 33.8 4.9 3.5 93 10.4 13.3 44.4 4.9 4.7
Switzerland 76 18.9 6.5 27.2 4.5 2.7 99 6.8 22.1 46 4.3 5.7
United Kingdom 155 17.5 5.6 28 4.4 3.1 126 7.5 16.3 43.9 4 5.2
Total 2,587 22.4 7.9 33.4 4.5 3 2,218 9.5 22 44.5 4.3 5
Female respondents with children under 7 years of age Male respondents with children under 7 years of age
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Table 3: Results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the gender gap in housework for all 21 
European countries, OLS estimation 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the European Social Survey 2010 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
  
A. Differential Coefficients
Prediction of mean male housework hours 9.3***  
Prediction of mean female housework hours 22.1***  
Difference (Total Gender Gap in housework hours) -12.7***
B. Endowment Effect (Gender Gap in housework due to 
different characteristics)
housework hours partner 7.3***  
education 0.20**   
working hours in paid employment -0.5*    
proportion of household income provided by respondent -6.8***  
Total Endowment Effect 0.2
C. Interactional Effect  (Gender Gap in housework due to 
the interaction of characteristics and slope)
housework hours partner -4.8***  
education -0.2**   
working hours in paid employment -0.2
proportion of household income provided by respondent 4.0***  
Total Interaction Effect -1.2
D. Coefficient Effect (Unexplained part: Gender Gap in 
housework due to differences in intercept and slopes)
housework hours partner -2.7***  
education 6.7***  
working hours in paid employment -0.5
proportion of household income provided by respondent 6.1***  
Constant -21.5***
Total Coefficient Effect -11.8***
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Table 4: Results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the gender gap in housework hours for each of the 21 European countries, OLS estimations 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the European Social Survey 2010 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  
Countries
Prediction of fathers' 
mean housework
Prediction of mothers' 
mean housework
Gender Gap in 
Housework
Endowments Effect
Unexplained part of the 
Gender Gap 
Interaction Effect
Belgium 7.9*** 18.6*** -10.8*** 4.9 -8.3*** -7.3*
Croatia 9.8*** 29.0*** -19.3*** 6.3 -22.4*** -3.2
Czech Republic 10.1*** 27.8*** -17.7*** -6 -11.9** 0.2
Denmark 7.1*** 15.1*** -8.0*** 0.3 -7.5*** -0.7
Estonia 12.3*** 23.8*** -11.5*** 1.2 -10.6*** -2.1
Finland 8.5*** 17.7*** -9.3*** 1 -8.1*** -2.2
France 5.9*** 13.9*** -7.9*** 2 -7.2*** -2.7
Germany 7.8*** 21.3*** -13.5*** 14.2** -11.5*** -16.2***
Greece 7.9*** 31.2*** -23.3*** -2.1 -22.6*** 1.4
Hungary 11.7*** 29.5*** -17.9*** 5.1 -20.3*** -2.6
Ireland 12.4*** 23.2*** -10.8*** 0.9 -9.8*** -1.9
Netherlands 8.6*** 20.3*** -11.7*** 2.2 -8.9*** -5
Norway 7.6*** 14.6*** -7.0*** 1.4 -8.0*** -0.4
Poland 12.2*** 31.6*** -19.4*** 1.9 -15.0*** -6.2
Portugal 7.8*** 16.7*** -8.8*** 3.4 -6.8* -5.4
Russian Federation 14.3*** 27.6*** -13.3*** -8.3* -16.2*** 11.2*
Slovenia 12.2*** 21.3*** -9.1*** 6.4** -11.0*** -4.4
Spain 7.9*** 21.2*** -13.3*** -3.8 -11.9*** 2.4
Sweden 10.5*** 17.4*** -6.9*** 0.4 -7.6*** 0.3
Switzerland 6.5*** 18.4*** -11.9*** 1.1 -8.8*** -4.2
United Kingdom 7.5*** 17.1*** -9.6*** 1.9 -6.7*** -4.8
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Table 5: Correlation coefficients between the total and unexplained gender gap in housework hours and different 
leave indicators 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the European Social Survey 2010 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on O’Donnell et al. (2008) 
  
Total duration of 
leave (in months)
Paid duration of leave 
(in months)
Paid leave reserved 
for fathers (in 
months)
Baseline EGDL 
indicator
Father-centred 
EGDL indicator
Mother-centred 
EGDL indicator
Total gender gap in 
housework hours
0.193 0.081 -0.323 -0.273 -0.328 -0.178
Unexplained gender gap 
in housework hours
0.196 0.339 -0.164 -0.085 -0.140 0.013
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Figure 2: The total gender gap in housework hours per week related to different leave indicators 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the European Social Survey 2010, Moss (2010) and Dearing (forthcoming) 
Figure 3: The unexplained gender gap in housework hours per week related to different leave indicators 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the European Social Survey 2010, Moss (2010) and Dearing (forthcoming) 
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